Abstract Levillain et al. (Asia CCS 2015) proposed two cookie masking methods, TLS Scramble and MCookies, to counter a class of attacks on SSL/TLS in which the attacker is able to exploit its ability to obtain many encryptions of a target HTTP cookie. In particular, the masking methods potentially make it viable to continue to use the RC4 algorithm in SSL/TLS. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of TLS Scramble and MCookies when used in conjunction with RC4 in SSL/TLS. We show that, in fact, both are vulnerable to variants of the known attacks against RC4 in SSL/TLS exploiting the Mantin biases (Mantin, EUROCRYPT 2005): -For the TLS Scramble mechanism, we provide a detailed statistical analysis coupled with extensive simulations that show that about 2 37 encryptions of the cookie are sufficient to enable its recovery. -For the MCookies mechanism, our analysis is made more complex by the presence of a Base64 encoding step in the mechanism, which (unintentionally) acts like a classical block cipher S-box in the masking process. Despite this, we are able to develop a maximum likelihood analysis which provides a rigorous statistical procedure for estimating the unknown cookie. Based on simulations, we estimate that 2 45 encryptions of the cookie are sufficient to enable its recovery.
Introduction
The RC4 stream cipher was designed by Rivest in the 1980s. Due to the scarcity of good alternatives, its compact code size, and its good performance in software, the algorithm was widely adopted in practice, including in WEP, WPA/TKIP and SSL/TLS. Indeed, in mid 2013, AlFardan et al. [1] reported that RC4 was used in roughly 50% of all SSL/TLS connections. Also in 2013, the first serious cryptanalyses of RC4 in TLS were published [1, 6, 11] , with the attacks focussing on the recovery of often-repeated plaintext values in SSL/TLS connections (for example HTTP session cookies or user passwords), using known and newly discovered biases in the RC4 keystreams. Follow-up works [4, 5, 16] substantially reduced the numbers of ciphertexts needed to recover passwords and HTTP session cookies, by using more powerful biases and better statistical techniques, with the result being that the IETF eventually deprecated the use of RC4 in SSL/TLS [13] . Since the removal of RC4 in SSL/TLS from the main web browsers beginning in early 2016, the amount of RC4-protected traffic for this particular protocol has declined steeply.
One significant effort at remediating attacks targeting HTTP session cookies in SSL/TLS was made by Levillain et al. [8] . Their main idea was to mask the HTTP session cookie s, roughly speaking sending a randomly generated mask m immediately followed by the XOR of the mask with the HTTP session cookie s ⊕ m in place of the raw HTTP session cookie. This masking step removes the repeated plaintext needed for the known attacks against RC4 to succeed. In fact, this repeated plaintext requirement is common to a number of attacks against SSL/TLS, and the protection of RC4 was not the sole focus of [8] . Levillain et al. proposed two separate masking mechanisms, TLS Scramble and MCookies. These differ in the low-level implementation details but both follow the masking principle. Details of the two methods are given in Section 3.
Given the widely-deployed base of RC4 software, and the long-standing attractiveness of the algorithm to software developers, any attempt to resuscitate the algorithm for use in SSL/TLS is deserving of a thorough analysis. Moreover, the masking techniques of Levillain et al. are quite simple to understand and would be relatively easy for software engineers to deploy in practice, possibly easier than moving to a later version of TLS supporting more modern algorithms (e.g. AES-GCM in TLS 1.2). There is anecdotal evidence that RC4 is still in quite widespread use in legacy systems and data centres. In our opinion, this makes the cookie masking methods of [8] worthy of detailed examination when used in combination with RC4, even if RC4 is no longer considered a legitimate option for SSL/TLS in modern web browsers. 1 In this paper, we provide such a study of the two masking countermeasures proposed by Levillain et al. [8] . We show that neither provides a great deal of additional security compared to the previous generations of attack on RC4 .
In particular, we show that the TLS Scramble mechanism is vulnerable to a variant of the attacks of [4, 16] exploiting the Mantin biases [9] in RC4. The Mantin biases informally mean that patterns of the form ABSAB occur slightly more frequently than expected in RC4 keystreams. Here, A and B are byte values, while S denotes a byte string, and the strength of the bias depends inversely on the length of S. Put another way, if one XORs an RC4 keystream with itself at a particular shift of κ bytes, then the result in consecutive byte positions is more likely to equal 00, 00 than any other pattern.
If we set κ to be the length of the mask m in the TLS Scramble mechanism, and then consider the XOR of a ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext m||s ⊕m with itself at a shift of κ byte positions, we see that the mask m is cancelled out, while, because of the Mantin bias, so too is the keystream (at least, statistically speaking). Thus we will be able to recover the original plaintext value s. The actual attack on TLS Scramble is a little more involved than this, because in reality in the attack, we recover candidate pairs of plaintext bytes in consecutive positions (i, i + 1), along with likelihood information for each candidate pair, and our task is to stitch together the overlapping pairs to create high likelihood candidates for s over multiple byte positions. However, the techniques introduced in [4, 16] are readily adapted to handle this task: these techniques use dynamic programming (principally, the list Viterbi algorithm [15] ) to produce lists of candidates over multiple bytes given as inputs likelihood information for pairs of candidates on pairs of positions.
We provide a statistical analysis of the main part of our attack on TLS Scramble following the general approach introduced in [4] . This involves computing a log-likelihood function for a plaintext parameter corresponding to a pair of adjacent bytes from the cookie, and then showing how this likelihood can be maximised by evaluating a simple counting function on corresponding ciphertext bytes. We are able to approximate the distributions of the ciphertext counts, and, using theory of order statistics, compute the median rank of the log-likelihood of the true plaintext parameter as a function of the number of available ciphertexts, N . This enables us to make a prediction about the value of N needed for a successful attack in recovering each pair of cookie bytes. To complete the picture, we then give an experimental analysis of our attack on TLS Scramble when targeting complete HTTP cookies (rather than pairs of cookie bytes). The upshot is that, for TLS Scramble, an HTTP session cookie can be recovered using approximately 2 37 ciphertexts. This figure is not that much greater than the 2 30 -2 32 ciphertexts needed in previous attacks against RC4 in SSL/TLS [4, 16] .
Our attack for the MCookies mechanism is more complex, mainly because this second mechanism involves an additional Base64 encoding step being applied separately to the mask and the masked cookie prior to encryption with RC4. This encoding step maps 6-bit blocks of raw binary data to 8-bit printable ASCII values. Because of this extra encoding step, our XOR trick above no longer works directly. However, we still wish to XOR ciphertexts with themselves at fixed shifts to statistically remove the RC4 keystreams (recalling how the Mantin bias effects this on our behalf). We are then forced to deal with the XORdifferential properties of the Base64 encoding map. It transpires that the Base64 encoding negatively affects the statistical effectiveness of our attack and increases its ciphertext requirements, but not too badly. At a high level, this is because Base64 encoding, when considered as a 6-bit to 8-bit S-Box, has less than ideal differential properties.
We are able to obtain a closed-form expression giving the log-likelihoods of pairs of 6-bit plaintext values from the original cookie in terms of a scaled count over ciphertext bytes, with the scale factors being derived from differential properties of the Base64 encoding. Maximising this expression immediately leads to an efficient attack recovering adjacent pairs of 6-bit plaintexts. We are then able to compute the approximate distribution of our log-likelihood statistic, and using this, develop a thorough understanding of which cookie values are likely to be difficult to recover in our attack, and why. In short, the difficult cookie values are the ones for which the corresponding rows in the difference table for the Base64 encoding take on many small values. This cookie-dependent attack behaviour is in contrast to previous attacks in the literature. Finally, we use an experimental analysis to judge the effectiveness of our attacks. We find that around 2 45 ciphertexts are sufficient to recover the target cookie with good probability. This is substantially greater than the numbers needed in previous attacks [4, 16] and for our attack on the TLS Scramble mechanism, but much worse than the security properties claimed for the MCookies mechanism in [8] .
In tandem, our two attacks indicate that the cookie masking mechanisms of Levillain et al. [8] only moderately increase the security of RC4 in SSL/TLS. We therefore do not recommend it for adoption.
Paper organisation
In Section 2 we provide more background on the RC4 algorithm and the specific Mantin biases that we will use in our attacks, while in Section 3 we describe the two different masking techniques of [8] , TLS Scramble and MCookies. Section 4 describes our attack on the TLS Scramble mechanism, while Section 5 develops our attack on MCookies. In Section 6 we report our experimental results, and in Section 7 we report our conclusions.
Background

The RC4 algorithm
RC4 allows for variable-length key sizes, anywhere from 40 to 256 bits, and consists of two algorithms, namely, a key scheduling algorithm (KSA) and a pseudo-random generation algorithm (PRGA) -see Fig. 1 . The KSA takes as input an l-byte key and produces the initial internal state st 0 = (i, j, S) for the PRGA; S is the canonical representation of a permutation of the numbers from 0 to 255 where the permutation is a function of the l-byte key, and i and j are indices for S. The KSA is specified in Algorithm 1 where K represents the l-byte key array and S the 256-byte state array. Given the internal state st r , the PRGA will generate a keystream byte Z r+1 as specified in Algorithm 2.
For an overview of how RC4 is used in TLS, see [1, 5] . The salient points for our analysis are as follows: in each TLS connection, RC4 is keyed with a 128-bit key that is effectively uniformly random; this key is used throughout the lifetime of a TLS connection, with the single keystream of bytes that it produces being split up into chunks as needed to encrypt plaintext records using a simple byte-by-byte XOR operation.
The Mantin biases
Many biases in the RC4 algorithm's outputs have been discovered over the years. Amongst the most powerful and useful for cryptanalysis are the Mantin biases [9] , as exploited in [4, 11, 16] .
The following result is a restatement of Theorem 1 of Mantin [9] , concerning the probability of occurrence of byte strings of the form ABSAB in RC4 outputs. Here A and B represent bytes and S denotes an arbitrary byte string of a particular length G. 
Result 1 Let
TLS scramble
The TLS Scramble mechanism, as the name suggests, is implemented at the transport layer as an extension of TLS. Specifically, TLS Scramble makes clever use of the support in TLS for compression of the data to be sent, and implements masking as an alternative compression algorithm. The compression algorithm is parameterized by a parameter κ denoting the length of the mask used, and is specified in [8] as the following three-step procedure with input a plaintext P :
1. Generate a κ-byte random string m. The corresponding decompression algorithm is straightforward, and reverses the above process by extracting the first κ bytes from the received string X, reconstructing M from this, and finally obtaining the plaintext P by XORing the |X| − κ last bytes of X with M. TLS allows a compression algorithm to return a plaintext record that is at most 1024 bytes larger than the original plaintext, which implies that κ ≤ 1024. As TLS Scramble replaces the compression mechanism of TLS, protection against the CRIME and TIME [14] attacks is trivially achieved. Note, however, that attacks similar to CRIME and TIME might still be possible if compression of the plaintext data is done in the application layer. Levillain et al. furthermore claim that TLS Scramble provides protection against BEAST, Lucky 13 [2] , RC4 biases [1, 4-6, 11, 16] , and POODLE [10] attacks when using the recommended parameter κ ≥ 8.
MCookies
The second mechanism from [8] , MCookies, introduces masking in the application layer by modifying how web servers handle secure HTTP cookies. Specifically, the HTTP protocol allows a web server to define a cookie to be stored by the client, which will then include the stored cookie on subsequent requests to the same origin. This enables the web server to authenticate requests coming from clients who have already authenticated themselves, e.g. by providing the correct login credentials at the beginning of the HTTP session. In this case, cookie recovery is a desirable goal for a potential attacker, as this would allow him to impersonate clients. MCookies aims at strengthening the protection of cookies when the HTTP session is protected by TLS (i.e. HTTPS) by additionally masking the cookies. Concretely, MCookies modifies the HTTP server behaviour as follows:
Cookie definition When the web server receives a set-cookie request from a web application, e.g. for cookie name SESSI D and cookie value V , it generates a random mask M such that |M| = |V |, and constructs a masked set-cookie header of the form Set-cookie:SESSI D = M : M ⊕ V (as opposed to the normal unmasked header Set-cookie:SESSI D = V ).
Cookie restitution and redefinition Upon receiving a request containing SESSI D = X : Y , the web server sends SESSI D = X ⊕ Y to the web application, which corresponds to the original, unmasked cookie. In its response to the client, the web application will then either (1) redefine the cookie, which corresponds to the cookie definition above, (2) erase the cookie, in which case the web server will not have to take further action, or (3) leave the cookie unchanged, in which case the web server redefines the cookie V by generating a new mask M such |M | = |V |, and sets the new cookie value to M : M ⊕ V as in the cookie definition above.
For maximal compatibility, the characters used in cookies are typically restricted to a subset of the printable ASCII character set. Base64 encoding [7] is recommended for this purpose in RFC 6265 [3] . Since both the mask M and the masked cookie M⊕V are (unless otherwise processed) raw binary values, the authors of [8] indeed suggest to use a Base64 encoding of these values (see footnote 8, page 231 of [8] ). While this might seem like a technical detail less relevant to security, it plays a significant role in the attack against MCookies presented in Section 5. The MCookies mechanism described above only modifies the server behaviour. Hence, an active attacker capable of either preventing messages from the client from reaching the server or otherwise ensuring that the server will not respond e.g. by causing a server-side error, will still be able to make the client repeatedly send the same cookie value over and over again, and thereby sidestep the counter measure implemented by MCookies. To address this, Levillain et al. propose an extension of MCookies which modifies the behaviour of clients as well. The extension is made possible by introducing a new cookie attribute, masked, which the server can use to indicate to the client that the corresponding cookie should be treated as a masked cookie. Upon receiving a cookie with attribute masked, a compatible client will respond by masking the cookie as described above i.e. it will generate a mask M and set the cookie value to M : M ⊕ V , and include the masked cookie in a new header field Masked-Cookie in the response to the server. Hence, when no changes are made to the cookie, the server will not have to include the masked cookie when responding to a client request, and can rely on the client to mask the cookie using a new random mask for each new request. For non-compatible clients, the server would have to resort to the MCookies mechanism described above, which does not require the client to be aware of the masking.
Both MCookies and the client-side extension are claimed to provide protection against BEAST, RC4 biases [1, 4-6, 11, 16] , and POODLE [10] , whereas the client-side extension is claimed to additionally provide protection against Lucky 13 [2] .
Attack on TLS scramble
Setting for the attacks
In this section and the next, we will present attacks against the TLS Scramble and MCookies mechanisms when used in combination with SSL/TLS and when the RC4 algorithm is used for encryption in SSL/TLS. We begin by describing the setting for both attacks, before focussing in the remainder of this section on TLS Scramble.
Both attacks are in the broadcast setting i.e. it is assumed that the attacker has access to multiple encryptions of the target plaintext. In our setting, this target is an HTTP cookie. This assumption holds in practice because of the attacker's ability to inject code (e.g. Javascript) into the client's browser. This code starts SSL/TLS connections to the server, into which the browser automatically places the target cookie.
Furthermore, we assume that the position of the targeted cookie and the surrounding plaintext bytes are known. This is true in our setting because of the highly structured and predictable nature of the initial messages in HTTP connections into which the target cookie is placed.
Finally, it is sufficient for an attack to output a list of candidate values for the cookie, since at the end of the attack, many candidates can be tried in turn to see if they are accepted by the server as the correct value. For example, in [4] , lists containing up to 2 18 queries are used, while in [16] , lists of size 2 23 were used in the most powerful attack. This assumption means that an attack can be considered successful whenever the correct cookie is contained in the output list. This makes it significantly easier to obtain a high success rate compared to attacks which are judged successful only if they output a single cookie candidate that is correct.
These attack assumptions are entirely realistic for SSL/TLS-protected HTTP sessionssee [1, 4, 16] for a more detailed discussion.
The attacks are based on using the Mantin bias which, recall, can be phrased as follows: Let z i denote the ith keystream byte generated using RC4 with a randomly chosen key and let
. In other words, the chance of a keystream byte pair repeating has a relative bias of δ G , where G denotes the distance between the pairs.
Recovering two cookie bytes with a single ciphertext
For the remainder of this section, we focus on TLS Scramble. Recall that TLS Scramble masks the entire plaintext with a mask M constructed by repeated concatenation (and possible truncation) of a randomly chosen κ-byte mask m. Let m = m 1 · · · m κ , where each m i corresponds to a byte value.
Consider first a single encryption of a byte pair from a target cookie at location i, (v i , v i+1 ), and let (c i , c i+1 ) denote the corresponding ciphertext byte pair. For notational convenience, we will assume that the mask m is exactly aligned with (v i , v i+1 ) i.e. v i will be masked with m 1 and v i+1 will be masked with m 2 (the attack will work equally well when this is not the case). We can now express (c i , c i+1 ) as
where z j is the j th RC4 keystream byte. Furthermore, we may assume that the plaintext byte pair (v i−κ , v i+1−κ ) at location i − κ is known. The ciphertext byte pair (c i−κ , c i+1−κ ) corresponding to the encryption of (v i−κ , v i+1−κ ) can then be expressed as:
Note that due to the distance of exactly κ between the byte pairs (v i , v i+1 ) and (v i−κ , v i+1−κ ), the same bytes, m 1 and m 2 , are used in the masking. Hence, by XORing the two ciphertext byte pairs and the known plaintext byte pair, we obtain the byte pair (1) for encryptions using a random RC4 key. Furthermore, let θ = (v i , v i+1 ) be a parameter specifying the target cookie byte pair. Then, from the Mantin bias, it follows that
This implies that, given the observation (x i , x i+1 ), the likelihood of the parameter θ is given by
Applying the method of maximum likelihood estimation would immediately suggest settingθ , the maximum likelihood estimator for θ , to (x i , x i+1 ) as computed in (1).
Recovering two cookie bytes with many ciphertexts
The above analysis only considers a single ciphertext. However, it is assumed that multiple encryptions of the target cookie (and known plaintext in offset positions) are available to the attacker, and we wish to make use of all of these ciphertexts in a likelihood analysis.
Let N denote the number of ciphertexts available and let
denote the vector of byte pairs obtained from these as shown in (1). Furthermore, let
) from X i which are equal to the parameter θ . Extending the above likelihood expression to take into account N ciphertexts instead of a single one, we obtain:
where the last equality follows by noting that, for the N − S(θ; X i ) cases where
Now applying the method of maximum likelihood estimation suggests using as a maximum likelihood estimateθ for the unknown cookie byte pair (v i , v i+1 ) the value maximising the above likelihood expression. Since maximising an expression is equivalent to maximising its logarithm (to any base, but we work with base 2 throughout), we see that we should setθ to the value maximising the log-likelihood:
Since the term −16N and the scale factor log(1+δ κ−2 ) here are the same for every candidate value, we see that it is sufficient to pickθ that maximises S(θ; X i ), that is,θ should be set to be the two-byte value that occurs most often in X i . Hence, a simple attack targeting a single cookie byte pair only, can be implemented by computing the counts S(θ; X i ) for all 2 16 possible values of the parameter θ , and simply returning the value of θ having the highest count.
Evaluation of the attack recovering two cookie bytes with many ciphertexts
It is intuitively clear that, for large enough N , this procedure will produce the correct result, since the target cookie byte pair will eventually have the highest count with overwhelming probability. In this subsection, we adapt the analysis of [4] to obtain a closed form expression for the success probability of the preceding two-byte recovery attack as a function of N and κ.
Let θ * denote the true value of the plaintext parameter θ . The random variable S(θ * ;
is approximately distributed as Bin(N, 2 −16 ). For the attack to be successful in a given instance, it is required that the realisation of the single random variable S(θ * ; X i ) should exceed realisations of the 2 16 − 1 other random variables S(θ; X i ).
If we write μ = N 2 −16 , then E(S(θ * ;
For the values of N and hence μ = 2 −16 N of interest to us, these binomial random variables are very well-approximated by normal random variables, and we essentially have
where N(μ, σ 2 ) denotes a Normal distribution with mean μ and standard deviation σ . We will treat the 2 16 random variables S(θ; X i ) as being independent, but of course they are not, since they must sum to N . It is now convenient to consider the scaling
Since J (θ; X i ) is an affine transformation of the original log-likelihood function, it follows that the value of θ which maximises J (θ; X i ) is also the maximum likelihood estimate θ of the parameter θ given the known data X i . It is easy to see that J (θ; X i ) has a Normal distribution with unit variance in both cases (θ = θ * and θ = θ * ). In fact we have:
Furthermore, we may essentially regard all of these random variables J (θ; X i ) as being independent since the random variables S(θ; X i ) are close to being independent.
Thus maximising the function J (θ; X i ) (which is equivalent to maximising S(θ; X i )) will be successful in giving the true plaintext parameter θ * if a a realisation of a normal N(μ where denotes the distribution function of a standard normal N(0, 1) random variable. Taking κ = 9, which is the value we will use in our experiments in Section 6 and larger than the minimum value of 8 suggested in [8] , gives δ κ−2 = δ 7 = 0.791 · 2 −8 . Hence
From this expression, the expected value of the median rank of θ * can be computed for any number of ciphertexts N . Table 1 shows some values of interest. For example, the last two entries show that N = 2 37 ciphertexts should be sufficient to ensure that the log-likelihood of θ * is the largest amongst the 2 16 possible values, and therefore that the correct pair of plaintext bytes is recovered in the attack. The number of ciphertexts required for a successful attack here can be contrasted with the corresponding 2-byte recovery attack of [4] ; there, low values for the expected median rank could already be achieved with around 2 32 ciphertexts. The difference is attributable to the attack of [4] being able to use multiple Mantin biases in concert, whereas our attack can only make use of one, at a gap of G = κ − 2.
Recovering full cookies
The above attack can be repeated for adjacent cookie byte pairs, assuming the relevant plaintext bytes are known, to recover a longer cookie value i.e. assuming plaintext bytes v i−κ , . . . , v i+α−1−κ are known, the α target cookie bytes v i , . . . , v i+α−1 can be correctly recovered with high probability for sufficiently large N by repeatedly running the above attack for each of the non-overlapping cookie byte pairs (v i , v i+1 ), (v i+2 , v i+3 ) , . . . , (v i+α−2 , v i+α−1 ) (here we assume α is even). However, a more effective attack is possible, and one which can output a list of high likelihood candidates for the complete cookie.
The attack is still based on identifying the candidate with the highest likelihood estimate, but now we will consider the entire cookie byte string v i · · · v i+α−1 . Specifically, consider the parameter θ = v i · · · v i+α−1 corresponding to a byte string of length α, and let θ j = (v j , v j +1 ), i ≤ j ≤ i + α − 2, be the byte pair of θ starting at position j . Furthermore, let L j (θ j ; X j ) be the log-likelihood estimate for θ j = (v j , v j +1 ) as defined in (2) and let 
In other words, the attack should identify the byte stringθ = v i · · · v i+α−1 corresponding to the chain of overlapping byte pairs v i+1 ), ( v i+1 , v i+2 ), . . . , ( v i+α−2 , v i+α−1 ) for which the sum of the log-likelihoods for the individual byte pairs is the greatest. A formal justification for selecting this summation formula can be found in [4] , but it is intuitively the right metric, and we omit the details here.
While the number of possible chains grows exponentially in the length of the chain, the above problem can be solved efficiently using dynamic programming techniques, such as the Viterbi algorithm. This will produce a single candidate for the length α cookie. Using the list Viterbi algorithm [15] instead, we can find the L largest candidates, with L being a parameter of the algorithm that largely dictates its efficiency. See Section 6 for discussion of our experimental results using this approach.
Lastly, it should be noted that the attack still works if the known plaintext bytes start at position i − t · κ or i + t · κ, for any t ≥ 1. This allows the attack to recover cookies of length greater than κ. However, as t increases, the success probability of the attack decreases for a fixed number N of ciphertexts, as the relative Mantin bias δ t·κ−2 becomes weaker. An alternative approach would be to use known plaintext to recover the first κ cookie bytes, then use those recovered bytes as known plaintext to recover the next group of κ cookie bytes, and so on.
Attack on MCookies
In MCookies, only the cookie itself is masked. More specifically, a cookie value V is replaced with a string M:V ⊕ M where M is a randomly generated mask of length |V |. If this string was directly encrypted using TLS/RC4, the TLS Scramble attack described above would work equally well for MCookies. However, as highlighted in Section 3.2, since M, and therefore V ⊕ M, are binary strings, these are Base64 encoded to ensure that a "websafe" character set is used for the replaced cookie value. Recall that Base64 encoding will encode a binary string using the following fixed array of 64 ASCII characters: Hence, given a random mask M = m 1 · · · m α and a cookie V = v 1 · · · v α (where m i and v i represent 6-bit strings), the MCookies encoding scheme will result in the plaintext string:
base64[] = [A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P , Q, R, S, T , U, V , W, X, Y, Z, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l,
consisting of 2α + 1 bytes.
Let c 1 · · · c 2α+1 denote the TLS/RC4 encryption of this string, where each c i corresponds to a ciphertext byte (here we begin our indices at 1 for notational convenience, but the encryption of the encoded cookie need not begin at byte position 1 of the RC4 keystream and all indices can be adjusted accordingly). Similarly to the TLS Scramble attack, we will for 1 ≤ i < α consider the byte pair
formed by XORing pairs of adjacent bytes in the ciphertext at a shift of α + 1 positions.
To ease the notation, we will in the following set
formed by XORing pairs of adjacent bytes in the output of the MCookies encoding scheme at a shift of α + 1 positions. We will sometimes leave out the mask m j when Xb64[v j , m j ] appears in probability expressions involving a randomly chosen m j . Using this notation, we have that
Hence if (z i , z i+1 ) = (z i+α+1 , z i+α+2 ) occurs (as is the case for the Mantin bias), then we simply have
Thus we might hope to be able to recover the two 6-bit values (v i , v i+1 ) from the cookie in the same way as we did for the TLS Scramble mechanism, by analysing many ciphertexts and selecting as (v i , v i+1 ) the pair maximising an appropriate count of occurrences derived from a likelihood estimate.
Unfortunately, the value Xb64[v, m] is not unique for a fixed cookie value v = 0 when randomly choosing a mask m, so this idea does not work directly. However, the distribution of Xb64 [v, m] when considering all choices of m is highly dependent on v. This dependence is illustrated in Fig. 2 We now turn to formally describing a maximum likelihood analysis for the problem of selecting (v i , v i+1 ) given a collection of ciphertexts and corresponding observations of (x i , x i+1 ). This will lead to a concrete procedure for selecting pairs (v i , v i+1 ) (along with a likelihood estimate for each such pair). 
Likelihood analysis of MCookies for a single ciphertext
In the following we derive the likelihood of values θ = (v i , v i+1 ) given observed data (x i , x i+1 ) coming from a single ciphertext. We later extend this to the consideration of multiple ciphertexts. We will let capital letters denote value pairs (i.e. 
In the above, (3) introduces an auxiliary variable Y , while (4) follows from the independence of the choice of mask and the RC4 keystream generation. Equation (5) follows from splitting the sum over Y into two cases: where Y = X i and where Y = X i . In the former case, we have
which probability, from the Mantin bias, is equal to 2 −16 (1 + δ α−1 ). In the latter case, we have
where W = (0x00, 0x00). Here, the probability is approximately 2 −16 (in the assumed absence of any keystream bias). Finally, (6) follows from some simple algebraic manipulation.
Thus we arrive at:
as an expression for the likelihood of parameter θ (which, recall, is a possible value of the 6-bit pair of values (v i , v i+1 ) from the cookie). So, given a single ciphertext, the maximum likelihood method would simply dictate selecting asθ , the maximum likelihood estimator for θ , the value that maximises the probability Pr[Xb64[θ ] = X i ]. Note that there may be several values θ attaining the same value, because the map Xb64[·] is not injective.
Likelihood analysis of MCookies for multiple ciphertexts
We now consider a vector of N values X i = (X (1) i , . . . , X (N) i ) derived from the ciphertexts of N encryptions of the target cookie. This cookie is originally encoded as 6α bits, which are mapped to α bytes by Base64 encoding and thence to 2α + 1 bytes by the MCookies mechanism. We still focus on the recovery of two consecutive 6-bit portions (v i , v i+1 ) of the target cookie V = v 1 . . . v α . We let θ denote this value, regarded as a parameter.
We let
is the count of X i values equalling a given Y . Extending the previously derived likelihood expression to take into account X i as opposed to just a single pair X i , we obtain
yielding a log-likelihood expression:
Since, for each choice of θ , the additive term −16N and the multiplicative factor δ α−1 are the same, we see that in order to determine the maximum likelihood estimatorθ we can instead maximise the scaled log-likelihood:
This analysis leads directly to an attack recovering two 6-bit values (v i , v i+1 ) from the cookie: simply compute the above sum for each candidate θ = (v i , v i+1 ) and output the valueθ having the highest value.
Analysis of the scaled log-likelihood
The expression for SL(θ; X i ) in (7) can be interpreted as saying that, in order to evaluate the (scaled) log-likelihood of a given θ , we take a scaled sum of the 2 16 counts S(Y ; X i ) with the scale factors being the probabilities Pr[Xb64[θ ] = Y ] (where the probability is taken over the suppressed mask value M). Note that the majority of the scale factors will be zero, because the output tables of the function Xb64 are quite sparse (cf. Fig. 2 , showing the output behaviour for a single 6-bit input value, whereas we are now considering pairs of 6-bit input values θ ).
There are many pairs θ, θ for which the distributions Xb64[θ ], Xb64[θ ] are quite close and which therefore present "close" sets of scale factors when evaluating the modified log-likelihood expression (7). Thus we can expect such pairs θ, θ to lead to comparable likelihood values. Since the success of the attack relies on the likelihood of θ * , the true value of the parameter, exceeding the log-likelihoods of all the other 2 12 −1 values θ , it is clear that the attack performance will now depend heavily on θ * , with poorer performance in those cases where the distribution of Xb64[θ * ] is close to the distribution for other values θ , and better performance when it is not (equivalently, larger number of ciphertexts will be needed in such cases to get a good success probability for the attack). This behaviour is in contrast to our previous attack on TLS Scramble, and indeed prior attacks in the literature. Moreover, we can expect our maximum likelihood attack on MCookies to require more ciphertexts than our attack on TLS Scramble because of the presence of the Xb64 map, which effectively reduces the size of the biases involved in making the attack work. Intuition for this can be gleaned from looking just at the likelihood expressions based on a single ciphertext, where the term 2
We formalise the above intuitions in the remainder of this section. First, we develop an understanding of the distribution of S(Y ; X i ); we then apply this to compute the distribution of SL(θ * ; X i ), where θ * is the true value of the plaintext parameter, and of SL(θ; X i ) for θ = θ * .
First, we claim that
To see why, recall that
Here, (v i , v i+1 ) is the true pair of 6-bit cookie values, i.e. the value of θ * . Alternatively, this can be written in our vector notation as:
Hence, a specific value Y arises for X i from a ciphertext if either
In the former case, we have an event with probability
because of the Mantin bias. In the latter case, we have an event with probability approximately
This can be seen by noting that with X i fixed and Xb64[θ * , M] also fixed to some value Y = Y , then given any fixed Z i , the probability that Z i+α+1 provides a solution (9) is approximately 2 −16 . Here we make the reasonable assumption for RC4 keystreams that Z i+α+1 is still uniformly random when conditioned on a fixed Z i and Z i+α+1 = Z i . These two events are exclusive. So, summing the above two probabilities and simplifying, we obtain
Our preceding claim that
now follows directly from the definition of S(Y ; X i ) and the assumption that the N different ciphertext byte pairs X (j ) i behave independently. We now use the usual Normal approximation to the binomial distribution (which certainly holds well for the large N that we consider) to approximate the distribution of S(Y ; X i ) by N(q θ  *  ,Y N, 2 −16 N) where
Henceforth, we assume that the Normal distributions describing the random variables S(Y ; X i ) are independent. With this computation in hand, we can now evaluate the distribution of SL(θ; X i ). Specifically, we use standard results for the mean and variance of scaled sums of independent Normal distributions to deduce that
and then
In the above expressions for the mean and variance of the approximate distribution for SL(θ; X i ), the quantity (θ * , θ) is formed as an inner product between the two distribu-
One can also think of it as a scaled version of the inner product between two rows of Xb64[·], the difference map of the 12-bit to 16-bit S-box obtained from the Base64 encoding map, and therefore as a measure of correlation between the two distributions or table rows. Thus (θ, θ) and (θ * , θ * ) are norms of these rows.
As a particular case of the above computations, where we substitute θ by θ * we have that
where
We see that the difference in means for the distributions SL(θ * ; X i ) and SL(θ; , θ) is small) will be hard to distinguish via the two likelihood functions SL(θ * ; X i ), SL(θ; X i ): their means will tend to be close, and it is therefore probable that SL(θ; X i ) will exceed SL(θ * ; X i ), so that the maximum likelihood estimator will produce the wrong output (i.e.θ = θ * ). Furthermore, if (θ * , θ * ) is small, then we might expect this effect to be amplified: while the mean of SL(θ; X i ) will not exceed that of SL(θ * ; X i ), the variance of SL(θ; X i ), being proportional to (θ, θ), could significantly exceed that of SL(θ * ; X i ) for some values of θ . Then there is a fair chance that SL(θ; X i ) will exceed SL(θ * ; X i ) despite having a lower mean. Generally, (θ * , θ * ) is small when the distribution Pr[Xb64[θ * ] = Y ] takes many positive (and necessarily small) values. This effect can be quite large: for example, when θ * consists of 2 6-bit all-zero values, we have Pr[Xb64[θ * ] = (0x00, 0x00)] = 1 so that (θ * , θ * ) = 1 (the largest possible value for ), but when θ * = (0x2d, 0x2d) we have (θ * , θ * ) = 0.00494385, which is 202 times smaller than the maximum value.
Recall also that the maximum likelihood approach succeeds only if SL(θ * ; X i ) exceeds SL(θ; X i ) for every choice of θ = θ * , and there are 2 12 − 1 such choices where the procedure could fail. Thus the above effects are magnified by the large number of θ values that need to be considered.
Finally, we note that the difference in means is equal to 2 −16 Nδ α−1 (θ * , θ), while the corresponding difference in means for our TLS Scramble attack is equal to 2 −16 Nδ κ−2 . In general, δ α−1 and δ κ−2 will be different but of the same order of magnitude. On the other hand, (θ * , θ) acts as a scaling factor in reducing the difference of means when comparing our two attacks. This gives a heuristic reason for why our MCookies attack will require more ciphertexts than our attack on TLS Scramble: the log-likelihood measures are harder to distinguish for MCookies because their means are closer together.
In summary, we have obtained approximations to the distribution of the likelihood measures SL(θ; X i ); their subsequent analysis suggests that certain values for θ * , the true plaintext parameter, will be difficult to recover with high reliability. 
Recovering full cookies
Finally, we turn from consideration of adjacent pairs of cookie symbols to the problem of recovering full cookies in an attack.
As in TLS Scramble, we can approximate the log-likelihood for the entire cookie value θ = v 1 · · · v α by the sum of the (approximate) log-likelihoods for the overlapping 6-bit value pairs
is an array of size N × (α − 1) obtained from the available ciphertexts.
Of course, common terms (−16N) and scale-factors (δ α−1 ) can be removed from the expression for L j when computing the summation over j values.
Our attack will then identify the cookie valueθ = v 1 · · · v α which maximizes L(θ ; X). As in the TLS Scramble case, this can be done efficiently using dynamic programming techniques. Our experimental results for recovering cookies protected with the MCookies method are presented in the next section.
Experimental results
To validate the attacks presented in Sections 4 and 5 against TLS Scramble and MCookies, respectively, we ran several experiments simulating the attacks, and measured the obtained attack success rates. The details of the simulations as well as the obtained results are described below.
TLS scramble
Methodology For the attack against TLS Scramble, we used a mask length of κ = 9 (Levillain et al. [8] recommends κ ≥ 8), and mainly focused on the recovery of 16 unknown bytes of a Base64 encoded cookie. The ten plaintext bytes preceding and ten plaintext bytes following the cookie bytes were assumed to be known. This corresponds to a commonly encountered scenario for HTTP cookies. In this setting, we considered an attack using the known plaintext bytes preceding the cookie to recover the first eight bytes of the cookie, and the known plaintext bytes following the cookie to recover the last eight bytes of the cookie, effectively running the attack "backwards". Note that the strength of the Mantin bias δ k , and thereby the attack's success probability, decreases with the distance between the considered byte pairs i.e. considering the closest possible pairs of known plaintext and target cookie bytes is an advantage in the attack. Furthermore, we assumed the two halves of the cookie are recovered independently in the attack. This allow us to derive the success probability of recovering the entire 16-byte cookie from the success probability of recovering the first or last 8-byte half of the cookie (note that, when reordering the ciphertext bytes, it makes no difference whether the first or the last half of the cookie is recovered in the attack, as the Mantin biases are symmetric). Various optimisations of the attack in this setting are possible. It would, for example, be possible to exploit both the preceding and following known plaintext bytes simultaneously in the recovery of cookie bytes. We did not consider these optimisations further.
For the attack, we used the list Viterbi algorithm based on the likelihood estimate derived in Section 4.5 with a list size of L = 2 15 . Due to the properties of the algorithm, this allow us to derive the results for any L < 2 15 . In the attack, we consider the known byte immediately preceding the unknown cookie values to be part of the cookie when constructing the XOR values (x i , x i+1 ) defined in Section 4.2, and not part of the known preceding plaintext bytes (v i−κ , v i−κ+1 ). This ensures that the list Viterbi algorithm, which process the (x i , x i+1 ) byte pairs can be initiated with a known first byte value. Note, however, that no terminating byte value is known, as we target the recovery of half cookies.
To measure the success rate of the attack, we generated ciphertexts in sets of size N = 2 34 and N = 2 35 , and for each set stored the counts S(θ, X i ) defined in Section 4.3 for all possible values of θ and for the relevant values of i. These were then accumulated to create counts for progressively larger values of N of the form N = x · 2 34 for x ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 9}. In turn these counts were used in the attack simulation. We generated counts to simulate a total of 128 independent attacks. For completeness, we additionally simulated the attack for binary cookies consisting of 16 randomly chosen bytes (as opposed to Base64 encoded cookies) using a list size of L = 2 10 .
All computations needed for the simulations were done using a server equipped with a four-core Intel i7 3.4GHz CPU.
Results Figure 3 shows the measured success rate of the attack for the recovery of half of a 16-byte cookie for different values of N , whereas Fig. 4 shows the derived success rate for a full 16-byte cookie. The latter simply corresponds to the expected success rate of the recovery of both halves of the cookie, based on the measurements shown in Fig. 3 . Each curve represents an attack against either a Base64 encoded cookie (denoted b64) or As expected, Fig. 4 shows, for a fixed N , a larger list size L increased the success rate, with the success rate for the attack against a Base64 encoded cookie with list size L = 2 15 reaching 1 at N = 5·2 34 , whereas the corresponding success rate for a list size L = 1 is 0.2. Likewise, in the case of a cookie with byte values in the full byte range {0, 1} 8 , a success rate of 1 is reached for N = 9 · 2 34 and L = 2 10 , whereas the corresponding success rate for L = 1 is 0.45.
In Section 4 we showed that, once about N = 2 37 ciphertexts are available, we would expect the attack recovering 2-byte cookie values to succeed with high probability (because the expected value of the median rank of the log-likelihood of θ * is less than 1).
However, our experiments target full cookie recovery while the evaluation in Section 4 was for recovery of just 2 bytes from cookies. This makes our full cookie recovery attack harder to perform with N = 2 37 than the analysis of Section 4 would suggest. On the other hand, our use of a list Viterbi algorithm for large L makes cookie recovery easier (in that we adjudge an attack successful if the cookie appears anywhere in the output list). Despite these differences, the results portrayed in Figs. 3 and 4 are broadly consistent with the analysis of Section 4, with good success rates being found in our simulations across the board for N = 8 · 2 34 = 2 37 .
MCookies
Methodology For the attack against MCookies, we considered a cookie consisting of 11 bytes. This corresponds to a 16-byte cookie value when masked and Base64 encoded, including a single Base64 padding character '='. It results in a 33-byte encoded value when considering the entire MCookies encoding process.
In this setting, a list Viterbi algorithm with known first and terminating byte values can be used due to the HTTP cookie having a known character preceding the mask/cookie value (the character '='), the mask and the masked cookie value being separated by a known character (the character ':'), and the same padding character being used for both the mask and the masked cookie i.e. in the construction of the X i values described in Section 5.2, we considered the XOR of the encrypted mask including the preceding character '=', and the encrypted masked cookie including the preceding character ':'. We used a list size of L = 2 15 , which allowed us to derived the corresponding results for L = 1 and L = 2 10 .
Unlike the TLS Scramble attack, the success rate of the MCookies attack is dependent on the cookie value being recovered (see discussion in Section 5). In the attack simulations, we generated the used cookie values using AES in counter mode. Specifically, we set each byte of the key to the value 02, and the IV to a cookie number which was increased for each new cookie, starting with the value 1. The generated keystream was used as the byte values of the cookie.
The generated cookie values used in our experiments are shown in Fig. 5 .
For each cookie value, we generated ciphertexts in sets of size N = 2 35 , stored the counts S(Y ; X i ) defined in Section 5.2 for all possible values Y and the positions i ∈ {0, . . . , 15} corresponding to the length of the encoded masked cookie including the known preceding character. These counts were accumulated to construct counts for progressively larger N , but as the biases in the case of MCookies are significantly weaker than in the case of TLS Scramble, we considered N of the form x · 2 42 for x ∈ {2, . . . , 8}. Furthermore, due to the large amount of computational resources required, we were able to generate data sufficient to simulate only 16 independent attacks, each for a different cookie value. This corresponds to data derived from a total of 2 49 ciphertexts.
The generation of ciphertext data to simulate the attack for the first four cookies was done on a server equipped with two 14-core Intel Xeon 2.6GHz CPUs, whereas the generation of ciphertext data for the remaining cookies was carried out using Amazon Web Services (AWS) computing infrastructure. In total, the generation of ciphertext data required the equivalent of approximately 73,000 core-hours of computation on AWS; for the AWS computations, we used the largest available compute-optimized instances denoted c4.8xlarge. The part of the attack corresponding to running the list Viterbi algorithm was done on a server equipped with two 8-core Intel Xeon 3.3GHz CPUs. Each curve corresponds to an attack using the list Viterbi algorithm with a list size of either L = 1, L = 2 10 , or L = 2 15 . We note that even for L = 2 15 and N = 8 · 2 42 , two out of the 16 considered cookies were not recovered. Both of these cookies contain 6-bit substrings leading to some of the smallest values in the table for Pr[Xb64[θ ] = Y ] (these values are 2c, 2e, and 39; see Fig. 2 for a visual representation of the biases for these values). The poorer performance of our attack in these cases is consistent with our discussion in Section 5.3.
We are confident that with additional ciphertexts, these cookies would be recovered as well.
Generally, the recovery pattern is similar to the TLS Scramble attack, albeit higher values of N are required; the attacks using L = 2 15 and L = 2 10 perform significantly better than the attack for L = 1, while the difference between the performances for two larger values for L is less significant. Note that since only 16 attacks were simulated, the results shown in Fig. 2 represent a more noisy measurement of the attack performance than the corresponding measurements for TLS Scramble, which was based on 128 independent attack simulations.
Conclusions
We have presented a comprehensive analysis of the two cookie masking methods of [8] when used in conjunction with RC4. We used the method of maximum likelihood estimation to develop statistically rigorous attacks, coupled with extensive simulations to estimate their performance. In the case of TLS Scramble, we were able to adapt the techniques developed in [4] to perform a theoretical evaluation of the number of ciphertexts needed to guarantee that the attack is successful with high probability. In both cases, we make use of the list Viterbi algorithm to extend our basic attacks recovering adjacent pairs of cookie symbols to full attacks recovering complete cookies. Our analysis indicates that the cookie masking methods presented in [8] do enhance the security of RC4 in SSL/TLS when it is used to protect HTTP cookies, but not sufficiently to warrant deploying the mechanisms as they stand.
It is interesting that, while the Base64 encoding of the masked cookie in MCookies was presumably not intended as a security measure, the presence of this encoding step means that our attack against MCookies becomes significantly harder to mount in practice compared to our attack on TLS Scramble. More precisely, the cost of the attack rises from around 2 37 ciphertexts to around 2 45 .
For our MCookies analysis, it would be useful to develop a better understanding of the distributional properties of the simplified log-likelihood function given in (7), and use this to perform an extended analysis (possibly using order statistics) to make predictions about the number of ciphertexts needed to recover θ * correctly. It would also be interesting to extend our analysis to handle masking mechanisms using multiple masks, as hinted at in [8] as being a possible extension of MCookies. In particular, it would be useful to evaluate how much extra security would be obtained by involving additional masks.
